Impostrous domains
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In this talk I propose a novel treatment of some of the peculiar facts concerning anaphoric properties of imposters in English discovered in Collins and Postal 2012 (further: C&P). C&P argue that those facts strongly motivate the basic notion of antecedence, not reducible to coreference or coindexation, as central to any adequate description of anaphora. I suggest a simpler account of C&P’s facts that doesn’t rely on antecedence and also gets more accurate empirical coverage. The account is based on the idea that imposters define syntactic domains with special anaphoric properties. Most importantly, inside such domains any expression referring to the denotation of an imposter can only have 3rd person features.

Argument 1: Homogeneity. One of the most important discoveries of C&P is that on the face of it imposters, i.e. non-pronominal DPs denoting the speaker(s) (yours truly, the present authors etc.) or the addressee(s) (Your Honor, Madam, etc.) of the utterance, can antecede 1st/2nd person pronouns or 3rd person pronouns, or both. Particularly interesting are the cases in which imposters co-occur with both coreferent 3rd person pronouns and coreferent 1st/2nd person pronouns, as there we can observe a nontrivial effect of syntactic structure on the possibility of coreference.

(1) a. *[The present authors’1 university agrees that our1 results support their1 conclusion].
   b. Our1 university agrees that [the present authors’, results support their1 conclusion]. (C&P: 153)

The generalization behind these facts seems to be the following: a minimal constituent that includes an imposter and a coreferent 3rd person pronoun cannot include any coreferent non-3rd person pronouns. A fuller paradigm supports the generalization.

(2) a. * [The present authors’1 university agrees that their1 results support our1 conclusion].
   b. Our1 university agrees that [their1 results support the present authors’1 conclusion].
   c. *?? [Their1 university agrees that the present authors’1 results support our1 conclusion].
   d. *?? [Their1 university agrees that our1 results support the present authors’1 conclusion].

I propose that imposters define marked syntactic domains (further: I-domains), in which reference to the denotation of a particular imposter does not involve 1st or 2nd person features. Minimally, an I-domain includes just the imposter itself, as in (3a) below. A 3rd person pronoun referring to the speaker or the hearer (obviously, a very marked option) will be licensed as long as it is included in an I-domain containing the coreferent imposter, for example, in (3b) the I-domain is the whole sentence.

(3) a. [The present authors1] think that our1 book was a success.
   b. [The present authors1 think that their1 book was a success].

These intuitions could be formalized as follows:

(4) Definition: I-domain
   An I-domain of the imposter A is the minimal category dominating A and all (if any) 3rd person pronouns referring to [A].

(5) Condition on I-domains
   An I-domain of an imposter A cannot contain any participant (i.e. non-3rd person) pronouns referring to [A].

The reason for unacceptability of starred sentences in (1) and (2) is that in each of them, any constituent that includes a 3rd person pronoun and an imposter, also includes a 1st pronoun. Thus, I-domains in those sentences cannot include 3rd person pronouns (otherwise there would be a violation of the condition in (5)), and so those pronouns cannot refer to the speakers.

The system developed in C&P is more permissive. It only predicts that if there is a constituent that contains two pronouns but doesn’t contain an imposter, the pronouns have to agree in their person features, this follows from their antecedence-based Homogeneity Principle, (C&P: 143–145). (In a nutshell, the impossibility of coreference in (1a) in contrast to (1b) follows from a principle that requires
one of the pronouns to be the *immediate antecedent* of the other in (1a), but not in (1b). *Homogeneity*, in turn, requires that any two pronouns standing in an immediate antecedence relation (more generally, any two pronominal members of some *U*-availability chain, see definition in C&P: 143) agree.\(^5\)

The account proposed here is not based on the notion antecedence in C&P’s sense (where antecedence is an irreducible asymmetric relation between DPs and every pronoun is required to have a linguistic antecedent), yet it gets better empirical coverage than C&P’s account: while they correctly predict the pattern in (1a,b) and (2a,b), they fail to predict the impossibility of coreference in cases like (2c) and (2d).

**Argument 2: Principle C.** Another discovery of C&P is that imposters can obviate Principle C of Binding Theory. Imposters can be c-commanded by coreferent pronouns, as long as those pronouns are 1\(^{st}\) or 2\(^{nd}\) person:

\[\text{(6) a. } I_1 \text{ think that [Daddy}_1\text{] deserves a break.} \]
\[\text{b. * [He}_1\text{ thinks that Daddy}_1\text{ deserves a break]. (C&P: 133)} \]

For C&P, this is an argument for formulating Principle C in antecedence terms: “If a DP Q is an antecedent of a pronominal P, then P does not c-command Q” (C&P: 131).

In C&P’s logic, the reason why coreference is impossible in (6b) is that the imposter *Daddy* has to be the (immediate) antecedent of the c-commanding pronoun *he*. On the contrary, in (6a) the pronoun *I* doesn’t have to be anteceded by the imposter. *I* may be anteceded by AUTHOR, a silent DP on the left periphery of the sentence (cf. Ross’s (1970) performativity hypothesis).

I suggest that this is also not a decisive argument in favor of antecedence-based theory of anaphora. Rather, these facts suggest that I-domains have a property that can override the standard Principle C effects: a non-pronominal DP inside an I-domain can be c-commanded by a coreferent DP outside of that domain. In other words, **I-domains are islands for Principle C.** The example in (6a) is valid because the imposter *Daddy* has to be inside an I-domain, while the pronoun *I* has to be outside of it. In (6b), the imposter and the coreferent 3rd person pronoun have to be inside one I-domain (otherwise the pronoun won’t be licensed).

Under this view, it is expected that the Principle C effects will be overridden not only by imposters themselves but also by any other DPs that happen to be contained inside an I-domain. This expectation seems to be corroborated by the data:

\[\text{(7) a. * She}_3\text{ asked me}_1\text{ to introduce my}_1\text{ parents’ to Mary’s}_3.} \]
\[\text{b. * She}_3\text{ asked [yours truly}_1\text{] to introduce my}_1\text{ parents’ to Mary’s}_3.} \]
\[\text{c. (?)She}_3\text{ asked [yours truly}_1\text{] to introduce his}_1\text{ parents’ to Mary’s}_3.} \]

(7a) is a clear example of Principle C violation. There is no imposter in (7a), so no special effects are predicted. In (7b) there is an imposter, *yours truly*, but its I-domain cannot include the DP *Mary*. If it did, it would also have to include the 1st person pronoun *my*, coreferent with the imposter, which is not an option for an I-domain. Finally, in (7c), the I-domain has to be large enough to include *Mary*, since it has to include at least the imposter and the coreferent 3rd person pronoun *his*. *Mary* would also fall into the I-domain, while the coreferent pronoun she may well be outside. Thus, (7c) is a configuration where the presence of an I-domain may effect the availability of coreference between *she* and *Mary*.

The proposed islandhood of I-domains vis à vis Principle C is supported by the fact that Principle C effects still hold for any R-expression and a c-commanding nominal, as long as they both are inside the same I-domain.

\[\text{(8) * [Yours truly}_1\text{ asked her}_3\text{ to introduce his}_1\text{ parents to Mary’s}_3.} \]

The observed Principle C effects can be accounted for without resorting to the C&P’s antecedence. They can also serve as another argument for a coherent notion of an I-domain.

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